TORTS-THE "FIREMAN'S

RULE"-INJURED FIREMEN MAY RECOVER DAMAGES FOR HARM CAUSED BY WILLFUL AND WANTON

MISCONDUcT-Mahoney v. Carus Chemical Co., Inc., 102 N.J.
564, 510 A.2d 4 (1986).
There is substantial agreement among the states that liability
will not attach to a landowner or occupier for negligence in the
creation of a fire which causes injury to a firefighter.' In New
Jersey, this doctrine is known as the "fireman's rule." 2 In a majority of states, the fireman's rule is premised on the notion that
firemen are licensees3 or invitees 4 when they enter upon property
for job-related purposes. Some states, such as New Jersey, however, have categorized firemen as occupying a unique status, 5 in
an attempt to limit the property-based distinctions associated
with the fireman's rule. 6 Thus, the adoption and development of

I

Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 273, 157 A.2d 129, 130 (1960).
2 See, e.g., Entwistle v. Draves, 102 N.J. 559, 560, 510 A.2d 1, 2 (1986);
Wietecha v. Peoronard, 102 N.J. 591, 593, 510 A.2d 19, 20 (1986); Berko v. Freda,
93 N.J. 81, 82-83, 459 A.2d 663, 663-64 (1983); Trainor v. Santana, 86 N.J. 403,
403-04, 432 A.2d 23, 23 (1981); Alessio v. Fire & Ice, Inc., 197 N.J. Super. 22, 24,
484 A.2d 24, 25 (App. Div. 1984); Ferraro v. Demetrakis, 167 N.J. Super. 429, 433,
400 A.2d 1227, 1229 (App. Div. 1979).
3 A licensee is a term of art which refers to a person who enters upon property,
with the owner's consent, for his own purpose. BiAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY 830 (5th

ed. 1979). See, e.g., Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co., 158 Cal. 579,
112 P. 459 (1910); Roberts v. Rosenblatt, 146 Conn. 110, 148 A.2d 142 (1959);
Romedy v. Johnston, 193 So.2d 487 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Baxley v. Williams
Constr. Co., 98 Ga. App. 662, 106 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. Ct. App. 1958); Pincock v. McCoy, 48 Idaho 227, 281 P. 371 (1929); Woodruff v. Bowen, 136 Ind. 431, 34 N.E.
1113 (1893); Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965); Aldworth v.
F.W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N.E.2d 1008 (1936); New Omaha Thomson-Houston Elec. Light Co. v. Anderson, 73 Neb. 84, 102 N.W.89 (1905); Davy v.
Greenlaw, 101 N.H. 134, 135 A.2d 900 (1957); Drake v. Fenton, 237 Pa. 8, 85 A. 14
(1912); Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Fryar, 132 Tenn. 612, 179 S.W. 127
(1915).
4 The term invitee refers to one who is invited to enter upon property, for his
and the owner's benefit, in connection with activities conducted upon those premises. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 742 (5th ed. 1979). See, e.g., Horcher v. Guerin, 94

Ill. App. 2d 244, 236 N.E.2d 576 (1968); Mistelske v. Kravco Inc., 88 Pa. D. & C. 49
(1953); Strong v. Seattle Stevedore Co., 1 Wash. App. 898, 466 P.2d 545 (1970).
See also Walsh v. Madison Park Properties, Ltd., 102 N.J. Super. 134, 245 A.2d 512
(1968) (majority opined that firemen engaged in fire inspection were analogous to
building inspectors and as such were considered invitees).
5 Krauth, 31 N.J. at 272-73, 157 A.2d at 130. Firemen have been labeled sui
generis, meaning "[o]f its own kind or class."

BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1286 (5th

ed. 1979).
6 Krauth, 31 N.J. at 273, 157 A.2d at 130. New Jersey courts have reasoned that
a firefighter's status is unique in that he cannot be denied access to private property. Id. at 272, 157 A.2d at 130. Based upon this fact, the courts have opined that
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the rule in New Jersey has been based solely upon public policy
and a balancing of equities.7 In Mahoney v. Carus Chemical Co.,
Inc. ,' the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged such policy
considerations when it held that wanton and willful misconduct is
an exception to the immunity offered by the fireman's rule.9
Carus Chemical Company, Inc. (Carus) was the exclusive
producer of potassium permanganate in the United States.' °
Carus manufactured this substance under the brand name
"Cairox.""' Originally, Cairox was packaged in metal containers,
as opposed to fiber-paper drums, because Carus believed this
packaging would reduce the risk of fire.' 2 In December 1975,
13
however, Carus began packaging Cairox in fiber-paper drums.
By 1978, several fires, traceable to Cairox, confirmed that such
14
packaging created a significant risk of spontaneous ignition.
Thus, after a fire occurred at the Bethlehem Steel Co. in April
1978, Carus made a conscious decision to stop packaging Cairox
in fiber-paper drums.' 5 This formal decision was exemplified by
an internal marketing memorandum and a subsequent notice to
customers.

16

On June 13, 1978, Carus shipped Inversand Company (Inversand) eighty-six metal drums and one hundred, discontinued
fiber-paper drums of Cairox.17 Approximately one hour after the
shipment arrived, an employee noticed smoke coming from one
of the fiber-paper containers of Cairox. 18 The ensuing fire ultia fireman is not a trespasser, licensee, or invitee because his public right to enter
upon property is not dependent upon a landowner's consent or invitation. Id.
7 Id. at 273, 157 A.2d at 130.
8 Mahoney v. Carus Chem. Co., Inc., 102 N.J. 564, 510 A.2d 4 (1986).
9 Id. at 579, 510 A.2d at 12.
10 Id. at 568, 510 A.2d at 6. Potassium permanganate, KNn0 4 , is an inorganic
oxidizer which speeds the burning of combustible materials and tends to react violently when used in combination with flammable materials. Id. at 568-69, 510 A.2d
at 6.
11 Id. at 568, 510 A.2d at 5.
12 Id. at 569, 510 A.2d at 6.
13 Id. The plaintiff, Thomas Mahoney, alleged at trial that the decision to use
fiber-paper drums, instead of metal containers, was motivated by the company's
economic interest in saving $35,000 per year. Id.
14 Id. at 568-70, 510 A.2d at 5-7.
15 Id. at 571, 510 A.2d at 7.
16 Id. The internal memorandum was dated April 17, 1978, one week after the
Bethlehem Steel Co. fire. Id.
17 Id. The plaintiff alleged at trial that the hybrid shipment of metal and fiberpaper containers was done to exhaust the supply of fiber-paper drums before
changing solely to metal containers. Id. at 568, 510 A.2d at 5.
18 Id. at 571, 510 A.2d at 8. The shipment arrived at the Inversand warehouse
on June 19, 1978. Id.
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mately required the attendance of seven volunteer fire
companies.19
Thomas P. Mahoney was among the volunteer firefighters
called to the Inversand fire.20 In the course of fighting the fire, a
wall collapsed on Mahoney, causing him serious permanent injuries. ' Mahoney instituted suit against Carus, Inversand, and In22
versand's parent company, Hungerford & Terry, Inc.22 In the
action against Carus, Mahoney asserted a claim based on alleged
willful and wanton misconduct.2 3
Basing its decision on the fireman's rule, the superior court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. 24 The appellate division affirmed the trial court's holding. 25 Focusing primarily on the plaintiffs claim against Carus, the New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' opinion. 26 The court
held that while the fireman's rule prevents recovery for negligence, it does not preclude an action by an injured firefighter
against a defendant whose reckless or willful misconduct created
the fire hazard.27 In addition, the court held that the fireman's
rule barred any claims based on principles of strict liability.28
The court remanded the matter to the trial court for a determination of other issues which might exculpate the defendants.2 9
Prior to Mahoney, the seminal New Jersey decision regarding
the fireman's rule was Krauth v. Geller.3" In Krauth, a fireman
19 Id.

Id. at 567, 510 A.2d at 5. Mahoney knew he was confronting a chemical fire
and was aware of the dangers associated with entering a building engulfed in that
type of fire. Id.
21 Id. at 567, 571, 510 A.2d at 5, 8. Mahoney sustained massive bums, multiple
contusions, and a fractured right arm and pelvis. Id. at 567, 510 A.2d at 5.
22 Id. Barbara Mahoney, Thomas Mahoney's wife, was also a party to the suit.
Id. at 567 n. 1, 510 A.2d at 5 n. 1. The court, however, in order to simplify its analysis, did not refer to Mrs. Mahoney in its opinion. Id.
23 Id. at 580, 510 A.2d at 12. Mahoney's complaint additionally was premised on
products liability. Id.
24 See id. at 567, 510 A.2d at 5.
25 Id. Both lower courts' decisions are unreported.
26 Id. at 583, 510 A.2d at 14.
27 Id. at 576, 579, 510 A.2d at 10, 12.
28 Id. at 581-82, 510 A.2d at 13.
29 Id. at 583, 510 A.2d at 14. The court noted that there were triable issues as to
whether Inversand's liability was excused by the fireman's rule. Id. Such liability,
the court averred, may be due to failure to warn of structural defects in its warehouse. Id.
30 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960). While Krauth'has been relied on by later
decisions as the basis for the fireman's rule, the Krauth majority cited to Villano v.
Pure Oil Co., 62 N.J.L. 37 (Sup. Ct. 1938), as relevant to their decision. Krauth, 31
N.J. at 273, 157 A.2d at 130. In Villano, a firefighter was injured at a fire when an oil
20
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brought suit against a landowner for injuries sustained when he
was called to extinguish an overheated oil-burning stove. 3 ' The
trial court entered judgment in favor of the fireman.32 The appellate division, however, reversed the lower court's decision.33
In affirming the appellate division's ruling, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that a landowner, who carelessly starts a
fire, is not liable to a paid fireman even if the risk of injury was
foreseeable. 4
The Krauth court noted that the underlying justification for
this rule emanates from an "assumption of risk" analysis, in that
the landowner is not deemed to have breached a duty of care
owed to the firefighter by negligently causing a fire.3 5 The court
asserted that fairness barred an action by a fireman against an
individual for creating a hazardous situation which the fireman
was trained and paid to abate.36 Additionally, the majority stated
storage tank exploded. Villano, 62 N.J.L. at 38. The firefighter brought suit against
the landowner for dangerous use of property. Id. Based on the premise that a
fireman assumed the risks incident to his profession and therefore could not recover damages, the Villano majority granted the defendant's motion for non-suit.
Id.
31 Krauth v. Geller, 54 N.J. Super. 442, 448-49, 149 A.2d 271, 274-75 (App. Div.
1959). The oil-burning stove, referred to in Krauth, is more commonly known in
the building industry as a "salamander." Id. at 448, 271 A.2d at 274. The device is
a heating apparatus used during construction to dry a building's interior, plaster
walls. Id.
In Krauth, the West Orange Fire Department was summoned on two consecutive days to the defendant's partially constructed home by neighbors to extinguish
an overheated stove. Id. at 446, 449, 149 A.2d at 273, 275. Subsequently, a fire
department official reprimanded the defendant for leaving the stove unattended
while it was burning. Id. at 449, 149 A.2d at 275. Three days later, however, the
fire company again responded to a call from the defendant's neighbors regarding a
fire at his home. Id. at 448, 149 A.2d at 274. This time, the firemen discovered that
the house was filled with smoke because the stove had been burning unsupervised
in the basement. Id. at 448-49, 149 A.2d at 274. The firemen proceeded to check
the house for fire. Id. at 449, 149 A.2d at 274. Krauth sustained injuries when his
vision was obstructed by smoke and he fell from a second floor balcony. Id., 149
A.2d at 274-75. Krauth brought suit based on negligenceand nuisance. Id. at 447,
149 A.2d at 273.
32 Krauth, 31 N.J. at 272, 157 A.2d at 130.
33 Krauth, 54 N.J. Super. at 459, 149 A.2d at 280. The appellate division reversed because they found that the lower court's charge to the jury regarding nuisance, as an alternate theory of liability, was without basis and prejudicial to the
defendant. Id. at 451, 149 A.2d at 276.
34 Krauth, 31 N.J. at 278, 157 A.2d at 133.
35 Id. at 273, 157 A.2d at 130-31. Assumption of risk is a doctrine which provides "that a person may not recover for an injury received when he voluntarily
exposes himself to a known and appreciated danger." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
113 (5th ed. 1979).
36 Krauth, 31 N.J. at 273-74, 157 A.2d at 131.
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that because of the overwhelming number of fires caused by careless behavior it would be infeasible to hold liable all those who
accidentally start fires.37 The court noted, however, that several
other states impose liability on individuals for creating ultrahazardous conditions "beyond those inevitably involved in fire
fighting. "38
In Krauth, the court declined to adjudicate the issue of
whether reckless or wanton behavior might be an exception to
the immunity created by the fireman's rule.39 The majority stated
that although the plaintiffs complaint alleged wanton misconduct, the plaintiff failed to establish such at trial. 40 Significantly,

the Krauth court noted that it was debatable whether culpability

4
was relevant to the issue of liability. '
Four years later, Jackson v. Velveray Corp.,42 provided the ap-

pellate division an opportunity to expound upon the "undue
37 Id. at 274, 157 A.2d at 131. Based on the same reasoning, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey extended the fireman's rule to police officers in Berko v. Freda, 93
N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983). For a thorough discussion of Berko v. Freda see
Note, Fireman's Rule Applicable to Police Officers, 14 SETON HALL 759 (1984).
38 Krauth, 31 N.J. at 274, 157 A.2d at 131. See, e.g., Bandosz v. Daigger & Co.,
225 Ill.
App. 494 (1930); Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp., 274 N.Y. 106, 8 N.E.2d
296 (1937); Drake v. Fenton, 237 Pa. 8, 85 A. 14 (1912).
39 Krauth, 31 N.J. at 277, 157 A.2d at 132. See infra note 41 and accompanying
text.
40 Krauth, 31 N.J. at 277, 157 A.2d at 132. The court noted that the plaintiff's
suit was instituted only with regard to the third instance in which the fire department had to respond to the defendant's home, even though the circumstances of all
three episodes were identical. Id., 157 A.2d at 133. The court asserted that while
the defendant's behavior may have been careless and exasperating, it was not wanton and willful misconduct. Id. Moreover, the court stated that although harm to a
fireman is foreseeable, in the case at issue there was no evidence to suggest that
there was a "high degree of probability that harm would befall a fireman." Id. at
277-78, at 157 A.2d at 133. The majority observed that wanton and willful misconduct was a conscious and intentional act or omission which is likely to result in
harm. Id. at 277, 157 A.2d at 132-33. Thus, the court ordered that judgment be
entered in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 278, 157 A.2d at 133.
41 Id. The court noted:
We are not concerned with the liability to a fireman of an arsonist
or one who deliberately induces a false alarm. Rather we are asked to
hold that "wanton" conduct resulting in a fire and consequent alarm will
suffice. Wantonness is not too precise a concept. It is something less
than intentional hurt, and so viewed is an advanced degree of negligent
misconduct. In the context of the policy considerations which underlie
the rule of non-liability for negligence with respect to the origination of
a fire, it is debatable whether degrees of culpability are at all pertinent.
At any rate, we need not decide the question since we can see no
basis for a claim of wanton misconduct as the term is ordinarily defined.
Id.
42 82 N.J. Super. 469, 198 A.2d 115 (App. Div. 1964).
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risk" doctrine mentioned briefly in Krauth.43 In Jackson, a fire at
the defendant's
place of business resulted in injury to several
44
firemen.

The plaintiff-firemen alleged that the defendant's

carelessness not only accelerated the spread of the fire, but exposed them to risks beyond those generally associated with their
jobs.4 5 In a unanimous opinion authored by Judge Sullivan, the
court asserted that the Krauth court had implied that the creation
of "undue risk" was an exception to the immunity afforded a
negligent plaintiff by the fireman's rule. 46 The court thus stated
that an individual could be held liable for negligent acts which
created dangers beyond those normally encountered while fighting a fire.47 Judge Sullivan asserted that the question of whether
a risk was "inherent" in firefighting was to be determined by the
trier of fact. 48 The court reasoned that while the fireman's rule is
cast in terms of the creation of a fire, it also extends to negligence
regarding the "spread of the fire". 49 Based on the plaintiffs' failure to establish "undue risk," however, the court remanded the
matter for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants.5 "
The next development concerning the fireman's rule ocSee id.at 475, 198 A.2d at 118.
Id. at 471-73, 198 A.2d at 116-17. The plaintiff, WilliamJackson, was injured
when struck by falling debris. Id. He later died from injuries sustained in the accident. Id.
45 Id. at 473-74, 198 A.2d at 117-118. The conditions which allegedly accelerated the spread of the fire and exposed the firemen to undue risks were as follows:
negligence in the operation and maintenance of a sprinkler system; storage of inflammable materials in violation of a city ordinance; failure to promptly notify the
fire department; failure to develop an employee fire brigade; cracks in the building
structure which permitted the fire to spread to higher floors; and poor housekeeping which facilitated the spread of the fire. Id. at 473, 198 A.2d at 117.
46 Id. at 474, 198 A.2d at 118.
47 Id. The court stated "undue risks" included violations of fire codes, storage
of hazardous substances, failure to warn of hidden dangers, and other perilous conditions unrelated to the fire. Id. at 475, 198 A.2d at 118-19. See also Walsh v.
Madison Park Properties, Ltd., 102 N.J. Super. 134, 245 A.2d 512 (App. Div. 1968)
(fireman did not assume "hidden unknown extrahazardous dangers" which were
not reasonably foreseeable).
48 Jackson, 82 N.J. Super. at 482, 198 A.2d at 122.
49 Id. at 475, 198 A.2d at 118. The court observed:
The general rule as to the nonliability of an owner or occupant to a
paid fireman for negligence is often stated in terms of nonliability for
negligence in creating or starting a fire. However, it seems clear that on
principle such rule of nonliability extends not only to negligence in creating or starting the fire but also includes negligence related to the
spread of the fire. . . . Indeed, the two situations are often
indistinguishable.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
50 Id. at 482, 198 A.2d at 122.
43
44
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curred in Ferrarov. Demetrakis.5" Ferraro involved an action to recover damages sustained at a fire caused by a defectively repaired
oil burner.5 2 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants.5 3 On appeal, the plaintiffs 54 advanced the argument that the defendants' wanton misconduct fell within an
exception to the fireman's rule created by the Krauth decision.5 5
Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that the fireman's rule was inapplicable because the plaintiffs were volunteers, not paid firemen.5 6 Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the fireman's rule did
not preclude recovery against third party tortfeasors.5 7
In rejecting the argument regarding volunteer firefighters,
the court stated that because the rationale for the fireman's rule
was equally compelling for paid or volunteer firemen, no line of
demarcation was necessary. 58 The court noted that both volunteer and paid firefighters face the same type of dangers and that
both are covered by the workmen's compensation statute.5 9 In
167 N.J. Super. 429, 400 A.2d 1227 (App. Div. 1979).
Id. at 430, 400 A.2d at 1228. The plaintiffs, an injured fireman and his wife,
and the administrators of the estates of two deceased firemen, sued the defendants
for negligent repair of a defective oil burner, or alternatively, failure to rectify a
known defective condition. Id. at 430-431, 400 A.2d at 1228.
53 Id. at 430, 400 A.2d at 1228. The defendants were a partnership trading as
Jineri Company, which owned the apartment building; Vito Albanese, Sr., Incorporated and Vito Albanese the lessee of the apartment building; and Combustion
Sales Corporation of New Jersey and M. G. Romano Plumbing & Heating Incorporated, the companies that allegedly were negligent in repairing the oil burner. Id.
at 430-31, 400 A.2d at 1228.
54 The plaintiffs in this action include an injured fireman, the injured fireman's
wife, and the wives of two firemen who died at the fire. Id. at 430-31, 400 A.2d at
1228.
55 Id. at 432, 400 A.2d at 1229.
56 Id. at 433, 400 A.2d at 1229.
57 Id., 400 A.2d at 1229-30. In Ferraro, the plaintiffs also asserted that the "undue risk" doctrine applied. Id. at 432, 400 A.2d at 1229. The court held, however,
that injuries attributable to smoke inhalation were a danger normally associated
with firefighting. Id. Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the fireman's rule denied firemen equal protection under the law. Id. at 431, 400 A.2d at 1228. The
court dismissed this issue because the plaintiffs failed to assert it at trial. Id. at 43132, 400 A.2d at 1228-29.
58 Id. at 433, 400 A.2d at 1229.
59 Id.
[The] plaintiff . . . argues that, because her husband was a volunteer
fireman, the Krauth rule does not bar recovery for his death. It is true
that the rule is usually stated in terms of a "paid" fireman. No case
discusses why the rule should be so limited. We see no reason to make
liability turn upon whether the fireman is full-time or only a volunteer.
The policy behind the rule is to acknowledge the nature of a fireman's
duties as determining the scope of risks which he must be deemed to
have assumed. A trained fireman faces the same dangers and must be
51
52
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addressing the rule's applicability to third party tortfeasors, the
court held that although the rule had been expressed in terms of
landowners and occupiers, it applied with equal force to other
negligent parties.6" The majority disagreed with the plaintiffs'
assertion that Krauth had limited the fireman's rule to negligent
conduct. 6 ' Instead, the Ferraro court stated that Krauth not only
refused to decide that issue, but implicitly disapproved of such an
exception.62
In 1986, Mahoney v. Carus Chemical Co., Inc., presented the
New Jersey Supreme Court with an opportunity to reevaluate the
standard for determining the scope of the fireman's rule.63 The
court averred that, while the immunity afforded to an actor
whose careless behavior causes a fire hazard is appropriate, the
basis for non-liability erodes when the defendant's conduct is
more culpable than mere negligence. 64 The majority, therefore,
held that just as the fireman's rule did not bar suits for intentional misconduct, it would not preclude actions for willful and
wanton misconduct.65
Justice Stein, writing for the majority, began his analysis by
deemed to assume the same risks whether he is a volunteer or salaried.
Moreover, volunteer firemen are expressly covered by the workers'
compensation law. Recall that the availability of workers' compensation
was mentioned in Krauth as a basis for precluding civil liability.
Id. (citations omitted).
60 Id. at 433-34, 400 A.2d at 1229-30. The court noted that although the fireman's rule had traditionally been interpreted as defining an owner or occupier's
liability, no New Jersey court had addressed the issue of recovery against a third
party. Id. at 433, 400 A.2d at 1230. The court observed, however, that other jurisdictions faced with this question had not limited the rule to landowners. Id. at 43334, 400 A.2d at 1230. Thus, the court asserted that if a landowner cannot be held
accountable to an injured fireman, a person with less control over the property, and
therefore less opportunity to discover latent defects, could not be charged with a
higher standard of care. Id. at 434, 400 A.2d at 1230. Ultimately, the court held
that a third party who negligently causes a fire, while liable to the landowner, is
immune from liability to an injured fireman. Id.
61 Id. at 432, 400 A.2d at 1229.
62 Id. at 432-33, 400 A.2d at 1229.
Plaintiffs . . . attempt to fit within a[n] . . . exception which they
claim was acknowledged by the Krauth court: recovery may be had where
the negligence rose to the level of wantonness. We disagree that any
such exception was recognized in Krauth. Indeed, the court expressly
declined to decide whether wantonness was an exception, citing the absence of evidence of such conduct in that case. Moreover, it implied
that the wantonness exception was not tenable. ...
Id. (citations omitted).
63 Mahoney, 102 N.J. at 566, 510 A.2d at 5.
64 See id. at 573-74, 510 A.2d at 9.
65 Id. at 579, 510 A.2d at 12.
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explaining that the fireman's rule was a product of careful inquiry
into the interaction between an individual's conduct in creating a
fire hazard, and the fireman's right to recover damages based
upon that conduct. 66 The court emphasized that this examination, while useful, was of limited value in that it was undertaken
only with regard to negligent conduct.67 The majority stated that
Krauth made no specific determination as to whether the immunity afforded by the fireman's rule should be extended to actions
where the degree of fault was greater than that associated with
ordinary carelessness. 6 Additionally, the court asserted that
although the appellate court in Ferrarohad held that wanton misconduct was not an exception to the fireman's rule, other jurisdictions are divided over the issue.69
The majority reasoned further that, although Krauth held
that culpability might be irrelevant, 7° New Jersey had long established a distinction between negligence and wanton misconduct. 7 1 The Mbhoney court recognized that wanton and willful

misconduct has been defined as an intentional act performed
with knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm, with
"reckless indifference to the consequences. 72 This distinction,
the court noted, had been recognized by the legislature.73 The
court stated that culpability beyond ordinary negligence has generally been an exception to grants of statutory immunity.7 4 The

court held that while negligence and wanton conduct are wholly
66 Id. at 571, 510 A.2d at 8. As an alternative theory of liability, the plaintiff
alleged a cause of action based upon products liability. Id. at 580-81, 510 A.2d at
12-13. The plaintiff claimed "that the risk-spreading rationale of products-liability
law justifie[d] the imposition of liability on manufacturers and distributors of defective products, who are best able to absorb and redistribute the cost of injuries." Id.
at 580, 510 A.2d at 12. In rejecting this notion, the court held that the doctrine of
strict liability was consistent with, and not an exception to, the fireman's rule. Id. at
581-82, 510 A.2d at 13.
67 Id. at 571-72, 510 A.2d at 8.
68 Id. at 572, 510 A.2d at 8.
69 Id. at 575, 510 A.2d at 10. Compare Rishel v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 466 So.2d

1136, 1138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) and Marquart v. Toledo, Peoria & Western
R.R. Co., 30 Ill. App. 3d 431, 433, 333 N.E.2d 558, 560 (1975) with Hubbard v.
Boelt, 28 Cal.3d 480, 485, 169 Cal. Rptr. 706, 709, 620 P.2d 156, 159 (1980).
70 Mahoney, 102 N.J. at 575, 510 A.2d at 10.
71 Id. at 574, 510 A.2d at 9. See, e.g.,
Foldi v. Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533, 549, 461 A.2d
1145, 1153-54 (1983); McLaughlin v. Rova Farms, Inc., 56 N.J. 288, 305-08, 266
A.2d 284, 293-95 (1970).
72 Mahoney, 102 N.J. at 574, 510 A.2d at 9 (quoting McLaughlin v. Rova Farms,
Inc., 56 N.J. 288, 305, 266 A.2d 284, 293 (1970)). See also Berg v. Reaction Motors
Div., 37 N.J. 396, 414, 181 A.2d 487, 496 (1962).
73 Mahoney, 102 N.J. at 576-77, 510 A.2d at 10-11.
74 Id.
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different concepts, the distinctions between
wanton and inten75
slight.
are
however,
behavior,
tional
Justice Stein opined that the Krauth decision implied that an
injured fireman should not be barred from recovering against an
intentional wrongdoer.76 Moreover, the court acknowledged
that such a proposition had been supported by decisions in this
jurisdiction,7 7 as well as in others.78 Intentional conduct, the
court asserted, denotes an actor that realizes "with substantial
certainty that harm is likely to result" from his actions. 79 Justice
Stein thus stressed that the justification for the fireman's rule
would be undermined if extended to malicious conduct. 80
In light of the foregoing, the court declined to extend the
immunity of the fireman's rule to willful and wanton acts. 8 ' Justice Stein recognized that the justification for not extending such
immunity to intentional behavior was equally compelling when a
defendant's actions were performed with reckless indifference to
the consequences.82 The Mahoney court acknowledged that it is
not burdensome to hold all whose wanton misconduct cause fires
75 Id. at 574, 510 A.2d at 9. The court asserted that the difference between wanton and willful misconduct and intentional misconduct was simply one of degree.
Id. For an act to be considered intentional the actor "must intend the harm or
realize with substantial certainty that harm is likely to result." Id. For an act to be
wanton and willful, however, the act must be intentional, but not the harm which
results. Id.
76 Id. at 572, 510 A.2d at 8.
77 Id. See, e.g., Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 90, 459 A.2d 663, 668 (1983); Ferraro
v. Demetrakis, 167 N.J. Super. 429, 433, 400 A.2d 1227, 1229 (App. Div. 1979).
78 Mahoney, 102 NJ. at 572, 510 A.2d at 8. See, e.g., Krueger v. City of Anaheim,
130 Cal. App. 3d 166, 181 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1982).
79 Mahoney, 102 N.J. at 574, 510 A.2d at 9.
80 Id. at 573-74, 510 A.2d at 9. The majority stated:
[C]onsiderations of fairness support the grant of immunity from suit by
firemen . . . to a citizen whose conduct is merely negligent. Hazards
negligently created are staples of the duties firemen ... are expected to
perform. Although the citizen immunized is not free from fault, the
quality of fault is not so severe that the grant of immunity from liability
for injuries sustained by firemen ... in the ordinary course of their duties offends our common sense of justice. By contrast, the degree of
fault of the intentional wrongdoer is substantial. Thus, to accord immunity to one who deliberately and maliciously creates the hazard that injures the firemen ... stretches the policy underlying the fireman's rule
beyond the logical and justifiable limits of its principle.
Many of the same considerations apply when the hazards to which
firemen ... are exposed are caused not intentionally but by willful and
wanton misconduct.
Id.
81 Id. at 579, 510 A.2d at 12.
82 Id. at 574, 510 A.2d at 9. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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liable for the injuries that may ensue, because most fires are not
attributable to such behavior."' The majority stated that it would
be unjust to allow culpable behavior, such as the defendant's, to
go unpunished. 4 Moreover, the court asserted that public policy
dictated that reckless behavior of this nature be deterred and
punished. 5 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that the fireman's rule would not insulate the defendant from liability if the conduct which created the fire hazard, and caused the
plaintiffs injuries, was willful and wanton.8 6
Justice Clifford began his dissent by acknowledging that the
fireman's rule was based primarily upon policy considerations,
not principles of law.8 7 The justice, however, characterized the
fireman's rule as a sensible, straight-forward principle "distinguished by its ease of application." 8' The justice asserted that
83 SeeMahoney, 102 N.J. at 577, 510 A.2d at 11. TheMahoney court observed that
"most fires are attributable to negligence." Id. (quoting Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J.
270, 274, 157 A.2d 129, 131(1960)). The court asserted that one of the underlying
justifications for the fireman's rule is that because most fires are carelessly started,
it would be too cumbersome to hold liable all those who negligently create fire in
which firemen are injured. Id. (quoting Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 274, 157 A.2d
129, 131(1960)). See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
84 Mahoney, 102 N.J. at 577, 510 A.2d at 11.

85

Id.

86 Id. at 579, 510 A.2d at 12. The court remanded the matter for further proceedings. Id. at 583, 510 A.2d at 14.
Mahoney was decided with the companion cases Wietecha v. Peoronard, 102
N.J. 591, 510 A.2d 19 (1986), and Entwistle v. Draves, 102 N.J. 559, 510 A.2d 1
(1986). In Wietecha, two policemen were investigating an accident when they were
injured because their patrol cars were struck by motorists. Wietecha, 102 N.J. at 544,
510 A.2d at 20. The Wietecha court held that the corollary of the fireman's rule "is
that independent and intervening negligent acts that [cause] injur[y] are not insulated." Id. at 595, 510 A:2d at 21.
In Entwistle, several police officers brought suit against a tavern owner, its employee, and landlord for injuries sustained when called to the premises to quiet an
unruly mob. Entwistle, 102 N.J. at 560-61, 510 A.2d at 2. The plaintiffs' original
compliant, based upon claims of negligence, was dismissed as being barred by the
fireman's rule. Id. at 561, 510 A.2d at 2. The plaintiffs later amended the complaint to include willful and wanton misconduct. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants' failure to provide adequate safeguards against violent patrons, in light
of similar prior incidents, constituted reckless misconduct. Id. Justice Stein writing
for the majority emphasized that the bar of the fireman's rule could not be circumvented merely by labeling negligent conduct "willful and wanton" for the purposes
of a lawsuit. Id. at 562, 510 A.2d at 2.
87 Mahoney, 102 N.J. at 583, 510 A.2d at 14 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 584, 510 A.2d at 14 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford stated:
What has evolved from Krauth in the twenty-six years that have passed
since it was decided is a sensible, straightforward, bright-line rule, distinguished by its ease of application: if a fireman is hurt as a result of his
exposure to the risks of injury that are inevitably involved in firefighting,
then his recourse lies with the public fisc, not with the tortfeasor.
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the majority's arbitrary attempt to carve an exception into the
rule was not sound policy.8 9 Justice Clifford averred that the majority's opinion would result in unequal treatment of injured firemen. 90 The justice emphasized that under such an exception,
two firefighters responding to identical fires, in different locations could sustain the same injuries, yet may not receive the
same recovery. 9' The legal remedy, the justice noted, would be
dependent upon whether one fire was carelessly started, and the
other caused by recklessness.9 2
Further, Justice Clifford criticized the majority's assertion
that firemen would "undoubtedly prefer" this modification of the
rule.9" The justice opined that during both the long history of
the fireman's rule and the many years since the Ferraro holding,
neither the Firemen's Association nor the New Jersey Police Benevolent Association had made any efforts to convince the legislature to abolish the rule.9 4 Moreover, inaction by the legislature
was viewed by Justice Clifford as indicative of their satisfaction
with the fireman's rule as originally adopted.9 5 Therefore, Justice Clifford suggested that the majority, if dissatisfied with the
Id. (citing Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983)).
89 Id. at 586, 510 A.2d at 16 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 585-86, 510 A.2d at 15-16 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 586, 510 A.2d at 16 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
92

Id.

93

Id. at 586-87, 510 A.2d at 16 (Clifford, J., dissenting).

94 Id. at 587, 510 A.2d at 16 (Clifford, J., dissenting).

Id. The justice asserted:
[T]he fact remains that Krauth, with its clear implication that proof of a
higher degree of recklessness would not serve to aVoid the rule, has
been on the books since 1960, and Ferrarov. Dematrakis, with its declaration that "wanton conduct with respect to the cause of a fire would not
require waiver of the general [fireman's] rule," has been around for
more than six years. During all or part of that time the amicus curiae,
New Jersey State Firemen's Associati6n, has lobbied in the legislative
hallways for the interest of the firefighters, as have the New Jersey State
Police Benevolent Association, amicus curiae in the companion case decided today, Entwistle v. Draves, for the interest of the State Police. It is
almost a matter susceptible ofjudicial notice that those associations are
among the most active, most vocal, and most effective in their representational endeavors. Despite this, their attorneys at oral argument before
us could not point to one effort on the part of those associations-or for
that matter on the part of any other firemen's or police organization-to
persuade the legislature to abolish or limit the "fireman's rule," so
firmly and so long established in our case law. One must assume that
those associations ... are satisfied with the rule as it has existed up until
today.
Id. (citations omitted).
95
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rule, should either abandon it completely or leave it untouched. 96
Justice Handler, in his dissent, agreed with the Mahoney majority only insofar as the court recognized that an individual "at
fault is not entitled to immunity. ' 97 Thejustice asserted that the
majority's exception for wanton misconduct illustrated the capri98
cious "hairsplitting" necessary to achieve equitable results.
Additionally, Justice Handler stated that entitlement to salary
and disability insurance are rarely adequate compensation for injury and are poor excuses for eliminating the duty of care owed
to public servants. 99 Finally, Justice Handler emphasized that
Justice Clifford's concern regarding uneven treatment of plaintiffs was well-founded.' 0 Therefore, Justice Handler concluded
that the fireman's rule should be abolished, and firefighters and
police officers should be given the same right to recover against
tortfeasors as any other injured party.' 0 '
The fireman's rule, as originally adopted in Krauth, was a
common sense solution to potentially excessive burdens that
could have faced the taxpayers and the courts. The rule was
adopted on the premise that it was impractical to permit firefighters to seek redress against all who carelessly caused fires, since
most fires are attributable to negligent conduct. Additionally,
the rule safeguarded the public in that once a fire was started, an
Id. at 586, 510 A.2d at 16 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
Id. at 588, 510 A.2d at 17 (Handler, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 589, 510 A.2d at 17 (Handler, J., dissenting). While Justice Handler
sympathized with the majority's struggle to articulate a reasonable explanation for
the equitable result it sought to achieve, he asserted that the majority's dilemma
illustrates the inevitable "hairsplitting" that is necessitated by retaining the rule
and attempting to identify credible reasons to distinguish suits where recovery is
permitted from those where it is denied. Id. Justice Handler opined that the majority's "newly-adopted rationale," which would require the courts to distinguish independent causes from normal risks or abnormal risks, was "simply a convenient
rationalization seized upon to overcome and ameliorate the arbitrary and regressive effects that inhere in the fireman's rule." Id., 510 A.2d at 17-18 (Handler, J.,
dissenting) (citing Berko v. Freda, 93 NJ. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983)).
99 Id. at 590, 510 A.2d at 18 (Handler, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 590-91, 510 A.2d at 18 (Handler, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 591, 510 A.2d at 18 (Handler, J., dissenting). Justice Handler wrote:
The rule draws artificial distinctions between police officers and
firefighters who are denied recovery under the fireman's rule and other
public employees who have the right to maintain traditional tort actions
against third parties for virtually all negligently inflicted injuries arising
in the performance of their employment .... [This] distinction impedes
the effectuation of a fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence that should
apply to firefighters and policemen: the right of redress for those injured as a result of the wrongdoing of others.
Id. at 590-91, 510 A.2d at 18 (Handler, J., dissenting).
96

97
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individual would not hesitate to seek assistance for fear of a later
suit by the firefighters. Moreover, the Krauth rule was equitable
because the courts realized
that firefighters are trained and paid
10 2
to respond to fires.

The supposition that the fireman's i-ule was based on sound
public policy considerations and equity, has been perpetuated by
the fact that the rule has been upheld by New Jersey courts for
almost five decades. Further support is provided by the fact that
the rule has met with general acceptance in most jurisdictions. °3
Given this wide base of support, the rule should not be abandoned, insofar as it applies to negligent behavior. On the contrary, the rule should be legislatively codified for two reasons.
First, the admittedly sound policy of the fireman's rule would not
have to rely solely on the judiciary for support. Second, and
more importantly, the legislature could provide specific guidelines regarding proper application of the rule.
Recently, the fireman's rule has encountered difficulties with
respect to whether different levels of culpability affect its application. ° 4 This problem, as well as other complications, could be
resolved by the legislature's intervention. The legislature, by virtue of their position, would be better equipped to gauge the
needs of the people, and to resolve the concerns associated with
the rule. In addition, this approach would guarantee the preservation of the fireman's rule, as well as provide new justification
for it. Furthermore, by providing relief for the difficulties that
have arisen, a legislatively codified rule would resolve dissension
among the courts. Finally, specific guidelines would permit the
fireman's rule to remain a bright-line test, characterized by its
inherent ease of application.
Sherilyn P. Lisowski
102
103
104

See generally Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960).
Id. at 273, 157 A.2d at 130.
See Mahoney, 102 N.J. at 578, 510 A.2d at 11-12.

